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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains a collection of essays related to economics and sports. The final 
essay looks at the growing controversy of publicly funded sports stadiums. Local 
governments are spending millions of dollars on sports stadiums as a means to spur 
economic development. Economic impact studies supporting public funding claim that 
the investment will bring thousands of jobs and additional revenue to the local 
community. Most of the academic literature on the subject has been less favorable . 
Much of the literature focused on broad measures of employment in metropolitan 
statistical areas. In this paper regression analysis is used to investigate the impact of an 
NFL franchise on county employment growth. The goal of the paper is to determine 
whether there is any measurable economic benefits to justify the use of public funds to 
built sports stadiums. 
The first essay examines the incentive for teams to invest in player talent in open 
and closed sports leagues. Sports leagues in North America are closed leagues that have 
a fixed set of teams. Entry is rare, requiring permission from incumbent teams. Outside 
of North America most leagues are open leagues that practice promotion and relegation. 
Entry into these leagues is primarily based on team performance. By solving for the 
equilibrium level of player talent, this research will show that under most conditions 
teams in an open league will spend more on player talent than teams in a closed league. 
The practice of promotion and relegation in an open league gives teams an additional 
incentive to invest in player talent that is not present in a closed league. 
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY LIBRAR't 
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The second essay explores entry restrictions across several sports. Many of these 
sports are open but have several hierarchal levels of competition. Entry into the top tier 
of competition depends on the players' ability to perform at the lower levels. While most 
entry rules appear to increase the quality of play, some, such as age restrictions in the 
WT A, appear to be motivated by cartel behavior. 
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ENTRY RESTRICTIONS IN LEAGUE SPORTS 
Introduction 
Most sports leagues in North America are closed leagues. Entry into a closed 
league requires the permission of league owners and usually involves a large entry fee. 
Leagues such as the National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball 
(MLB), National Football League (NFL) Major League Soccer (MLS) and the National 
Hockey League (NHL) are all examples of closed leagues. Most sports leagues outside 
of North America are open leagues. In open leagues, entry is determined by on the field 
performance. Open leagues are set up in hierarchical divisions and practice promotion 
and relegation. At the end of each season the worst performing teams in upper divisions 
are relegated to lower divisions and the best performing teams in lower divisions are 
promoted to higher divisions. 
The primary difference between an open and closed league is the ability for new 
teams to enter the existing league. Entry into a closed league requires the prior approval 
of the existing team owners and a large fee. A closed league will expand if there are 
profit opportunities in cities that do not have a professional team or to prevent entry by a 
competing league. Most likely a competing league would choose locations that were 
unexploited by an existing league. In order to prevent competition from the new league 
the existing league would choose to expand into the unexploited markets. Promotion and 
relegation in open leagues serves as a means of entry into the major leagues. Anyone 
could start a team, start competing at the bottom of the league, and gain entry into the 
major league over time. One drawback of the open league is that new teams must begin 
play at the bottom of the league and work their way up to the major league. 
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The scarcity of teams in a closed league enables teams to extract rents in the form 
of public subsidies for stadiums. Cities compete with one another to attract a major 
league team by building elaborate stadiums and granting generous rental agreements. 
These agreements are attractive to team owners because they increase the market value of 
the team. Owners receive those rents when they decide to sell their franchise (Sports 
Economist, 2005). Open leagues reduce the incentive for cities to offer public subsidies 
for stadiums. A club's threat of relocation is limited since another team can come into 
the market and take its place. A city will not be willing to spend millions of dollars to . 
attract a major league team since the team always faces the possibility of relegation. 
One benefit of a closed league is that it could promote financial stability in the 
league. Shared monopoly rent can allow a historically small market team, Green Bay in 
the NFL, to compete at the major league level. In addition to promoting financial 
stability, some forms of revenue sharing increases competitive balance. Competitive 
balance adds to the value of the league by providing a more appealing product to fans. It 
is not unusual to hear stories from English Football about teams in financial trouble. 
Poorly run teams will go out of business. 
The origins of closed leagues in North America lie in the history of baseball. The 
first baseball league was the National Association of Professional Base Ball Players, or 
the National Association (NA). The short history of the NA was marred in chaos and 
mayhem. With no set season to play, teams would just travel around the country playing 
games from city to city. These baseball tours were loosely organized, at best. Each game 
required the tedious tasks of determining the rules and the selection of umpires. This 
often led to long delays that alienated fans. Betting and gambling were widespread in 
baseball, during this period and for many years after (Rader, 1994). 
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In 1876, William Ambrose Hulbert saw an opportunity to supplant chaos with 
order and formed the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs, or the National 
League (NL). Hulbert and his supporters saw the advantage of forming a league that was 
more like a corporation rather than a league with open membership. Membership in the 
NL was restricted to teams in the nine largest cities: Boston, Cincinnat~ Hartford, 
Louisville, New York, Philadelphia and St. Louis. Any team wishing to join the new 
league had to first obtain the permission of the existing clubs. No club in a city with a 
population under 75,000 was permitted entry (Rader, 1994). 
The NL adopted many new practices that were absent from the NA. Players were 
no longer part of the decision making process, which differed greatly from the player 
friendly NA. Teams also started a revenue sharing plan to help the teams from smaller 
cities compete with the larger cities. Visiting teams received 50 percent of the base 
admission price to each game. Strict rules were put into place that protected a team's 
local market power. When a league team such as Philadelphia traveled to Boston, they 
were not allowed to play any other teams from Boston that were not part of the NL. 
Owners also adopted rules meant to keep player salaries down. No team was permitted to 
negotiate with another team' s players while the season was in progress. In previous 
leagues, players could walk out on a team in the middle of a season if they received a 
better offer from another team. In short, the National League was the first successful 
attempt at cartelizing a sports league. It is important to note, however, that although there 
are cartel elements in the NL' s structure, these organizational features arguably helped 
make baseball become a successful commercial enterprise. 
5 
While other sports leagues followed the NL's closed league structure, many sports 
played in North America have more open structures. Participation in open leagues is 
based on player performance. Players and teams must demonstrate their ability at lower 
levels before making it to the top level of their sport. However even some sports where 
entry is achieved on a competitive basis have rules, such as age restrictions, that may be 
motivated by cartel behavior. Systematic documentation of these rules and analysis of 
their impact is absent in the literature on the organization of sport. Hence in the next 
section, we discuss the evolution of rules in these sports. 
Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour 
The Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour, in contrast to the closed nature of 
the NL, is an open league. The Tour allows any player who demonstrates his ability to 
compete to participate in PGA events. The origins of the PGA Tour can be traced back to 
1968 when the tournament players created their own organization called the Association 
of Professional Golfers (APG) (PGA Tour, "History," 2005). The APG was short lived 
and the players eventually agreed to operate the Tournament Players Division. A IO-
member Tournament Policy Board governed the Tournament Players Division. In 1975, 
the Tournament Players Division was renamed the PGA Tour. 
Like other individual sports, the PGA Tour is set up as an open league. The 
overall objective of tour participants is to obtain their PGA Tour Card so they can 
compete in big money tournaments. Holding a PGA Tour Card earns a player full 
exempt status on the PGA Tour. Exempt status gives the player priority when signing up 
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for tournaments. (See Appendix A.) Non-exempt status players must wait to see if there 
are any open spots in the field or attempt to enter a tournament by playing in qualifying 
rounds or by receiving various exemptions. Holding a PGA Tour Card alone does not 
ensure success. PGA Tour Card holders compete to receive priority when signing up for 
PGA Tour events, with priority is based on performance as shown in the Appendix A. 
Table 1. Qualifying for a PGA Tour Card 
Current PGA Tour Top 125 on PGA Tour money list 
Members retain PGA Tour Card 
Nationwide Tour Top 20 on Nationwide Tour money list 
Members receive PGA Tour Card 
PGA Tour Qualifying Low 30 scores and ties in PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament 
Tournament final stage earn PGA Tour Card 
(PGA Tour, 2005) 
In order to retain their Tour Card, current PGA Tour Card holders must place in 
the top 125 on the PGA Tour money list. Players not making the top 125 must go to the 
Nationwide Tour or the PGA Tour Qualifying School, where they can attempt to again 
earn their PGA Tour Card. (See Table 1.) All players below the 125 on the PGA Tour 
money list are exempt to the final stage of the PGA Tour Qualifying School Tournament 
held once a year. The Qualifying Tournament is a three-stage tournament where the 
number of participants is reduced at each stage. The low 30 scores and ties in the final 
stage receive their PGA Tour Card and exempt status (PGA Tour, "Background," 2005). 
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Players on the Nationwide Tour can earn their PGA Tour Card by finishing the 
season in the top 20 of the Nationwide Tour money list. (See Table 1.) Other players on 
the Nationwide Tour are exempted in certain rounds of the PGA Tour Qualifying 
Tournament. Players ranked 21 to 35 on the Nationwide Tour money list are exempt into 
the final stage of the PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament. Players ranked 36 to 70 are 
exempt into the second stage of the PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament. Again, the low 
30 scores and ties in the final stage of the PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament receive their 
PGA Tour Card. (See Table 1.) 
Table 2. Qualifying for Membership on the Nationwide Tour 
PGA Tour Member Top 25 after the 125th position on the PGA Tour money list 
Win a Nationwide Tour event 
Nationwide Tour 
Members 
Finish 21-60 on Nationwide Tour Money List 
Qualifying Tournament 
Finish within top 80 and ties at annual Qualifying Tournament 
Participants 
(PGA Tour, 2005) 
In addition to competing for their PGA Tour Cards, players are competing to 
retain their status on the Nationwide Tour. Players finishing within the top 80 and ties at 
the PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament receive exempt status on the Nationwide Tour. 
(See Table 2.) 
Another way to receive or retain exempt status on the Nationwide Tour is to win a 
Nationwide Tour event. (See Table 3.) Players winning an official Nationwide Tour 
event receive exempt status for the remainder of the season and the next season. Players 
finishing 21-60 on the Nationwide Tour money list receive exempt status on the 
Nationwide Tour; the top 20 receive their PGA Tour Card. In addition to these, players 
can participate in Nationwide Tour events by participating in qualifying tournaments or 
by being a sponsor' s selection. 
Table 3. Qualifications for the PGA Tour Qualifying Tournament 
Exempt into 
Any person with PGA handicap of +2 or better 
First Stage 
Survivors of the First Stage 
PGA Tour members 
Exempt into 
Second Stage 
Winners of Nike Tour, Buy.com Tour and Nationwide Tour Events 
Certain members of European Tour, Japan Golf Tour, Australian PGA 
Tour, Southern Africa Tour, Asian Tour and Canadian Tour 
PGA Tour members who finished among the top 25 immediately after 
the 125th position on the PGA Tour money list 
Exempt into 
Players finishing 21-35 on the Nationwide Tour money list 
Final Stage 
Top three available players from the PGA European Tour, Japan Golf 
Tour and Australian PGA Tour money lists 
(PGA Tour, 2005) 
Players from around the world qualify for competition in the PGA Tour 
Qualifying Tournament. The minimum qualification for entry into the Qualifying 
Tournament is a documented handicap of +2 or lower. Again, certain Nationwide Tour 
members can earn exemptions into different stages of the PGA Tour Qualifying 
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Tournament. Several players are exempt into the second stage: PGA Tour members from 
the previous year, winners of Nike Tour, Buy.com Tour and Nationwide Tour events in 
the current and previous five years, and certain members of the PGA European Tour, 
Japan Golf Tour, Australian PGA Tour, Southern Africa Tour, Asian Tour, and Canadian 
Tour. There are many other ways for players to exempt into the second stage of the 
Qualifying Tournament. (See Table 3.) This study focuses on the players who can move 
from one tour to another. 
Several players may also exempt into the final stage of the Qualifying 
Tournament. (See Table 3.) These players include PGA Tour members who finished 
among the top 25 immediately after the 125th position on the PGA Tour money list, 
players finishing 21-35 on the Nationwide Tour money list, and the top three available 
players from the PGAEuropean Tour, Japan Golf Tour and Australian PGA Tour money 
lists. 
Ifwe accept the PGA Tour as the major league in golf, Tables 1-3 show that golf 
is in fact an open league. Competition is not limited to a fixed set of PGA Tour 
members. Players from all over the world have an opportunity to compete for a PGA 
Tour Card. The determinant of promotion to the PGA and success in golf is 
performance. 
Professional golf has not always been so open. In the early I900's, golf was a 
sport for the wealthy. This meant that minority players, mainly blacks, could not 
participate in PGA events. The PGA actually had a Caucasian only bylaw (Gabriel, 
2001). The United Golfers Association was formed in response to the constant 
discrimination against blacks. The UGA had many outstanding golfers including Bill 
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Spiller, Lee Elder and Charlie Sifford. Sifford became the first black player to win a 
PGA-affiliated event when he captured the 1957 Long Beach Open, which was not an 
official event because it was only 54 holes. He later won two PGA Tour events, the 1967 
Greater Hartford Open and the 1969 Los Angeles Open. Lee Elder became the first black 
player to play in the 1975 Masters in Augusta (Gabriel, 2001). 
Things began to change when in 1960 the attorney general in California told the 
PGA that they could not use public courses in California if there was any discrimination. 
The PGA countered that they would play on private courses, but the attorney general 
warned that would be illegal as well. The PGA gave in and dropped its Caucasian only 
rule. Black players continued to find it difficult to participate in PGA events, however, 
even after the elimination of the bylaw. Black players were prevented from entering 
locker rooms, clubhouses and sometimes even prevented from entering a golf course not 
only in the South but also throughout the country. Two recent events helped to solidify 
minority' s presence in modem golf In 1994, Tiger Woods became the first minority 
golfer to win a major amateur event at Shoal Creek. Years before the owner of Shoal 
Creek stated that he was not interested in having blacks join his club. Tiger Woods also 
won the Masters at Augusta National, a private club that was once segregated, and still 
does not allow women members. 
Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) 
The Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) was established in 1950. The 
13 founding members included Alice Bauer, Patty Berg, Bettye Danoff: Helen 
Dettweiler, Marlene Bauer Hagge, Helen Hicks, Opal Hill, Betty Jameson, Sally 
Sessions,.Marilynn Smith, Shirley Spork, Louise Suggs, and Babe Zaharias. The 
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LPGA's roots can be traced back the Women's Professional Golf Association (WPGA), 
which was established in 1944, but only lasted 5 years. Modeled after the WPGA, the 
LPGA' s purpose is to promote women' s golf and create opportunities for women in 
professional sports (LPGA, "Timeline," 2005). 
Clearly, the LPGA discriminates, as it is restricted to ladies. But just as clearly, 
this restriction is necessary to the survival of professional golf for women. In the absence 
of the restriction, more powerful, longer-hitting males from lesser tours would enter 
LPGA tournaments and win virtually all of the prize money. The restriction adds value 
in the overall marketplace by making possible a tour in which women can display skills 
in meaningful competition. 
In 1950 the LPGA had only 14 events with total prize money of $50,000. By the 
end of the decade players competed in 26 tournaments with $200,000 in prize money. 
The success of the LPGA continued into the 1960' s when the final round of the 1966 US 
Women' s Open became the first LPGA event televised nationally. In the 1980's, the 
LPGA benefited from increased corporate sponsorship and increased media exposure. In 
1989, players competed in 36 tournaments with an average purse of $385,000 for each 
tournament. Today, the LPGA Tour includes 34 events with total prize money of $45 
million. Players like Annika Sorenstam and Juli Inkster earn over $1 million a year. 
Part of the LPGA's success can be attributed to the quality of play by its 
participants. The LPGA has adopted an open league that requires players to constantly 
maintain and improve their skills. Players are classified as being exempt or non-exempt. 
Exempt status means that players are almost guaranteed a spot in the field of any 
tournament that they wish to play. Non-exempt players are able to compete in LPGA 
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events, but only if there are any spots open after the exempt players have signed up for 
the event. Priority during sign up is given to exempt players. The goal of every player is 
to obtain exempt status. Exempt status translates into more playing opportunities and 
higher earning potential. 
At any one time there are 144 exempt players on the LPGA Tour. There are 
several ways players can gain exempt status; all of them based on performance: the 
Futures Golf Tour, the LPGA Tour Qualifying School and the top 90 players on the 
LPGA money list. (See Table 4.) 
The Futures Tour was founded in 1981 with the purpose of providing women with 
the opportunity to improve their golf skills so they could advance to the LPGA. That 
goal has not changed and the Futures Tour has been formally called "the official 
developmental tour of the LPGA" since a formal agreement with the LPGA in 1999. 
Currently the Futures Tour includes 18 tournaments with a total prize of almost $1.25 
million. The top 5 players on the Futures Tour money list automatically obtain exempt 
status on the LPGA Tour, provided they compete in a minimum of six tournaments. 
Players ranked 6 through 10 get automatic entry into the LPGA Final Qualifying 
Tournament. 
Besides the competition for LPGA exempt status, players are also competing to 
remain Futures Tour members. There are several ways players can become eligible to 
play on the Futures Tour. Players who finish or tie in the top 90 on the Futures Tour 
money list are automatically eligible to compete on the Futures Tour the following season 
stated S. Allen at the LPGA (personal communication, 2005). Players who completed 72 
holes at the LPGA Final Qualifying Shirley Tournament, but did not receive LPGA 
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exempt status and who were not in the top 90 Futures Tour money list are granted Futures 
Tour eligibility. Players can gain eligibility by competing at the Futures Tour Qualifying 
Tournament. There are also several spots left open for top ranked amateurs and 
collegiate players and Futures Tour special invitations. There are several more sub-
categories of players that are eligible to play on the Futures Tour, but the important point 
is that even at the lower levels, eligible women must be at the top of their game. 
In addition to the Futures Tour, the LPGA Tour Qualifying School holds a series 
of events every year where players can earn LPGA exempt status. The event begins with 
two section qualifiers, one held in Florida and the other in California. The top 30 players 
from each of the sectional qualifiers then go on to compete in a Final Qualifying 
Tournament. The size of the field at the sectional qualifiers and the Final Qualifying 
Tournament varies from year to year. In 2003 there a field of 132 players competed for 
28 LPGA exempt cards. 
Table 4. Qualifying for LPGA Exempt Status 
Current LPGA Tour 
Top 90 on money list 
Players 
Top 5 on Futures Tour money list are granted LPGA exempt 
status 
Futures Tour Players 
Players ranked 6 through IO on the Futures Tour money list 
advance to the LPGA Final Qualifying Tournament 
Two Sectional Qualifiers: 
LPGATour Top 30 players from each advance 
Qualifying School Final Qualifying Tournament: 
Number of exemptions varies 
(LPGA, "Exempt," 2005) 
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For those already competing on the LPGA, the top 90 players on the LPGA 
money list receive exempt status for the following season. The next 5 players are eligible 
to compete in Futures Tour events. For the remaining players, the journey starts all over 
again. It' s back to trying to qualify for Futures Tour events or competing at the LPGA 
Tour Qualifying School. (See Table 4.) 
Like the PGA Tour, women' s professional golf is also an open league. 
Competition is not limited to a fixed set ofLPGA Tour members. Players from all over 
the world have an opportunity to compete for a LPGA Tour Card. The determinant of 
promotion to the LPGA and success in golf is performance of the players. 
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP} 
The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) was formed in 1972. It wasn' t 
until 1988 that the ATP seized control and replaced the Men's Tennis Council as the 
governing body of the circuit. The news conference to announce the leadership change 
was held in a parking lot because US Open officials barred players from using any on-site 
facilities (ATP, "Organization," 2005). 
Men's professional tennis is divided into several divisions: Grand Slams, ATP 
Tournaments, Challenger Series Tournaments and Satellite Series Circuits and Futures. 
The ATP governs Challenger Series Tournaments and ATP Tournaments including: 
Tennis Masters Cup, World Doubles Championship, World Team Championship, ATP 
Masters Series Tournaments, International Series Gold Tournaments and International 
Series Tournaments. 
Acceptance into the main draw of ATP and Challenger tournaments is based on a 
player's computer ranking. The higher a player's computer ranking the higher they are 
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seeded in the main draw. Generally higher seeded players face players of lower quality 
in the early rounds of a tournament. Players not initially accepted into the main draw can 
enter a qualifying tournament before the main event. The number of players accepted 
into the main draw after completion of the qualifying tournament differs between events. 
Other players can gain entry into the main draw by receiving wild cards. Wild cards are 
usually given out when the tournament committee has difficulty filling all of the spots in 
the main draw. Some spots may also be filled through sponsor exemptions. 
Although entry is primarily based on individual player ability to compete at the 
professional level, the ATP does have strict age limitations. (See Table 5.) No player 
under the age of fourteen can compete in an ATP or Challenger Series tournament. 
Players who are fourteen year old are eligible for entry into a maximum of eight ATP or 
Challenger Series tournaments. Players who have reached their fifteenth birthday are 
eligible for entry into a maximum of twelve ATP or Challenger Series tournaments. 
Players aged sixteen or older are not limited in the number of tournaments they may 
enter. 
Table 5. Age Restrictions for the ATP and Challenger Series Tournaments 
Age ATP Tournaments and Challenger Series 
16 and Older Unlimited 
15 12 
14 8 
< 14 0 
16 
(ATP, 2005) 
The only other restrictions imposed by the ATP are play-down restrictions and 
voluntary commitment requirements. These restrictions are pro-competitive since they 
require higher ranked players to forgo competing in low-level tournaments to compete in 
top tournaments. Players ranked 1-10 in the singles ranking are prohibited from entering, 
accepting a wild card and/or competing in a Challenger Series Tournament. Players 
ranked 11-50 are prohibited from entering, accepting a wild card or competing in 
Challenger Series Tournaments that offer less than $50,000 in prize money. The ATP 
has an incentive to maintain a high quality of play in its top tournaments. Play-down 
restrictions ensure that the highest ranked players in the world will be competing in the 
top events. These restrictions help to bring in sponsorship dollars by increasing demand 
for the event. The commitment agreement is voluntary. A Commitment Player is any 
player ranked in the top 50 in points that has signed a commitment agreement to the ATP. 
The agreement states that the player will participate in the singles event of all ATP 
Masters Series Tournaments for which he is accepted, the Tennis Masters Series and 2 
International Series Gold Tournaments. There does not appear to be any benefit to 
signing the commitment agreement. A player is not guaranteed a position in the main 
draw of any of the above tournaments if he signs the commitment agreement. 
Women's Tennis Association (WTA) 
The Women' s Tennis Association (WTA) was formed in 1973 in a London hotel 
room (WTA Tour, "Stories," 2005). A group of nine female tennis players, most notably, 
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Billy Jean King, were enraged by the disparity in prize money between men's and 
women's tennis. The 1970 Pacific South West Open paid the men' s champion $15,000 
and the women's champion $1,500. Today the WTA is a worldwide sports league with 
over 1,000 players from 71 countries. The 2005 season will feature 63 events with prize 
money totaling more than $57 million. (See Table 6.) 
Women's tennis is divided into three divisions. The top division is the WT A tour. 
Within the WT A are the Grand Slam, Tour Championships and Tier tournaments. The 
Grand Slam tournaments are the US Open, French Open, Wimbledon, and the Australian 
Open. The Tour Championships is a single tournament held at the end of each season 
with prize money over $3 million. Tier tournaments are ranked by total prize money 
available from tier one to tier five (WTA Tour, "Tier,"2005). (See Table 6.) The next 
division is the ITF Women' s Circuit tournament. Below the ITF are exhibition and non-
tour tournaments. 
Table 6. Tier Tournaments Ranked by Total Prize Money 
Tier Prize Money 
I $1,262,000 
II $585,000 
m $170,000 
IV $140,000 
V $110,000 
(WTA Tour, "Tier," 2005) 
Priority in tournament draws is based on a players ranking. The higher a player's 
ranking, the higher her position in the main draw of a tournament. Like men' s tennis, 
higher seeded players generally start off playing lower quality players in a tournament. 
Advancement in tournaments and in the player rankings is based on performance. 
Players are rewarded for their ability to compete. 
Table 7. WTA Age Restrictions 
WTA 
ITF 
Wild 
Exhibition 
Age 
Tour 
Women's Grand Slams 
Cards 
and Non-
Circuit Tour Events 
According 
18 Unlimited Unlimited All to Tour Unlimited 
Rules 
17 13 + Champs Any she qualifies 4 4 
for by ranking 
16 10 + Champs Any she qualifies 3 3 
for by ranking 
15 8 + Champs Any she qualifies 3 2 
for by ranking 
0 Except 
14 
for Wild 
7 0 3 1 
Card or 
Feed Up 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
(WTA Tour, "Age," 2005) 
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The WTA has several restrictions for player eligibility and age is one of them. 
(See Table 7). Players under the age of fourteen may not participate in any WTA Tour or 
ITF Women's Circuit tournaments. Players age fifteen may only participate in seven ITF 
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tournaments and one exhibition or non-tour event. Of the seven ITF events, only four 
may be for prize money greater than $10,000. The number of wild cards these players 
are able to receive is also limited. Players age fifteen may only participate in eight 
professional tournaments plus the Championships, if she qualifies, and three exhibition or 
non-tour events. Players age sixteen may participate in a maximum often professional 
tournaments plus the Championships, if she qualifies, and three exhibition or non-tour 
events. Players age seventeen may participate in a maximum of thirteen professional 
tournaments plus the Championships, if she qualifies, and four exhibition or non-tour 
events. Players age eighteen and older may participate in an unlimited number of 
professional tournaments on the WTA Tour and ITF Women' s Circuit (WTA Tour, 
"Age," 2005). 
Table 8. WT A Exempt Players Commitment Requirements 
Player Rank Commitment 
Gold 
1-6 
13 Tier 1 or Tier 2 Tournaments 
(minimum of 5 Tier I) 
7-10 
12 Tier 1 or Tier 2 Tournaments 
(minimum of 5 Tier I and 1 Tier 3) 
11-13 
11 Tier 1 or Tier 2 Tournaments 
(minimum of 5 Tier 1 and 2 Tier 3) 
14-20 3 Tier 2 Tournaments 
Silver 
21-30 2 Tier 3 Tournaments 
31-52 2 Tier 4 Tournaments 
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(WTA Tour, "Exempt," 2005) 
There are also minimum commitment requirements for players ranked 1 through 
52. Gold exempt players, players ranked 1 through 20, are required to enter a certain 
number of tier tournaments throughout the season. The remaining players, ranked 21 
through 52, are silver exempt players. These players are required to enter a certain 
number of tier 3 and tier 4 tournaments. The number of tournaments and the tier depends 
on a players ranking. (See Table 8.) These commitment requirements ensure that the top 
ranked players in the world show up for the big tournaments. Without these 
commitments, players would not participate and fan and sponsorship dollars would 
disappear (WTA Tour, "Exempt," 2005). 
The entry restrictions imposed by the WT A are a bit more problematic. While 
most sports have some age requirements, the WT A rules seem to go far beyond those 
sports. These age restrictions in the WT A could be motivated by cartel behavior. 
Existing WT A members over the age of 18, impose these rules to keep out younger 
talent. We see these restrictions in major league sports in North America so it is easy to 
see how they are a product of cartel behavior. It may worthwhile to study the age 
restrictions in the WT A in greater detail. 
Professional Bowlers Association (PBA) 
Eddie Alias started the Professional Bowlers Association (PBA) in 1958. The 
PBA was a not for profit entity that was responsible for setting up tournaments and 
getting commercial sponsors. In its first year of operation the PBA had only three 
tournaments. By 1963 there were 38 tournaments, many of which could be seen on 
national television (PBA, 2005). 
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The following decades could be characterized as successful for the PBA. The 
number of corporate sponsors grew year to year and several players earned relatively 
high incomes. In 1997, Brunswick signed a three-year, $3 million sponsorship package 
that included the sponsorship of three tournaments per year. In 1999, Johnny Petraglia 
became the twentieth player in PBA history to break the $1 million career earning mark. 
Attendance grew as well, in 1995 a PBA record 7,212 fans attending the US Open 
tournament in Detroit's Joe Lewis Arena. 
Big changes came to the PBA in 2000 when former Microsoft executives Chris 
Peters, Mike Slade and Rob Glaser purchased the PBA and turned it into a for-profit 
business. In an effort to increase its membership and tournament entries, the PBA 
announced it would create a set season with 20 tournaments. Total prize money for the 
tournaments was over $4 million. In addition to these moves, the PBA signed a three-
year exclusive deal with ESPN that gave tournaments move consistent television 
coverage. Television ratings increased 18% that year. 
The biggest changes from the new owners of the PBA were announced for the 
2004-05 season. Each of the 16 standard tournaments will feature an all-exempt 64-man 
field. Of those 64 entries, 40 will have exempt status for the full tour season. These 40 
exemptions are based on the previous seasons champions and points leaders. Seven 
additional exemptions come from point leaders from the seven PBA regions. Eleven 
players can gain season exempt status based on their performance at the PBA Tour Trials. 
The PBA Tour Trials are completely new to the PBA The PBA will hold five daily 
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tournaments on different lane conditions. Points are awarded based on a player's finish 
each day. After all five events, the top eight point leaders earn a full season exemption. 
In addition to exempt players, 5 players can gain entry into a tournament in weekly 
qualifying tournaments and 1 player will obtain a commissioner exemption (PBA, 2005). 
Prior to the above changes, a tour player could be exempt. However, exempt 
status only gave entry priority onto a tournament. The field for any particular event was 
determined by the size of the bowling center. A 40 lane bowling center would have a 
maximum field size of 160. C. Kistner, (personal communication, 2005) Coordinator of 
the PBA Tour, stated that the top 50 players from the previous year received exempt 
status, which guaranteed that they would not be shut out of a tournament stated. 
Table 9. PBA Tournament Field and Season Exempt Status 
Tournament Field, Total of 64 players 
40 season exempt players 
Based on previous season tour champions and points 
leaders 
7 Point leaders from the seven PBA regions 
11 season exempt players Based on performance at Tour Trials 
5 players Weekly qualifiers 
1 player Commissioner's exemption 
(PBA, 2005) 
23 
Why the change? The owners of the league and the participants in bowling 
tournaments are separate entities. The owners of the league want to maximize profit. In 
order to do that they must sign lucrative sponsorship deals and television contracts. It 
would be difficult to sign sponsorship deals if the quality of play was low. Creating a 
league structure that is open and based on player performance increases the effort from 
league participants and increases the overall effort and performance of the league. In 
short, the open system creates a better product that is more appealing to fans. This in tum 
will attract more sponsorship deals and better television contracts. 
Professional bowlers would most likely be unhappy with these changes. The 
changes mean more effort, hence higher costs, in order to obtain the season exemptions. 
One change that favors tournament participants is a guaranteed prize. All tournament 
participants will receive some compensation, even those finishing last. This gesture by 
league owners may be an attempt to fend off criticism from players by compensating 
them for their increased effort. 
Conclusion 
Sports leagues can be characterized as open or closed. Entry into a closed league 
is based on one' s ability to pay existing league owners an entry fee. Entry into an open 
league is based on performance. Each of the sports discussed in this paper are individual 
sports where entry is based on player performance. 
Corporations are only willing to sponsor competitive tournaments that have the 
potential to attract a large number of fans. This gives the organizers of the sports league 
the incentive to create an open league that increases the quality of play. Limiting 
competition among players would decrease the quality of play and limit the available 
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sponsorship dollars. The WT A is a perfect example of these different incentives coming 
together to form an open league sport based on player performance. Female tennis 
players were unhappy with the prize money available to them, so rather than limit 
competition and create a closed league, they created an open league based on player 
performance. The result has been an increase in tour sponsorship and an increase in 
available prize money. 
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PROMOTION AND RELEGATION IN SPORTS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether open sports leagues that use a 
system of promotion and relegation will increase economic welfare by increasing 
spending by teams, when compared to closed sports leagues. Teams want to avoid 
relegation because relegation means playing in a division with lower revenue generating 
potential. Generally the quality of play is lower than in the top division and fan interest is 
lower which implies lower revenue for teams that face relegation. The potential for 
teams to play in the top division with greater revenue potential and the possibility of 
winning the championship gives minor league teams an incentive to invest in more player 
talent than teams in a closed league. Promotion and relegation adds an additional 
dimension to league play that is not present in a closed league. The additional incentive 
to invest in player talent will increase consumer surplus since teams seek promotion to 
the top division while trying to avoid relegation. In general, competitive pressure will 
raise the overall quality of play in an open league above that in a closed league. 
Open Versus Closed Leagues 
Most North American sports leagues are closed leagues that operate with a fixed 
set of teams season to season. All of the major sports leagues in North America, Major 
League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League and the 
National Football League are closed leagues. Entry or expansion of the league is rare, 
granted by existing teams owners, and is typically accompanied by a large fee. Since 
1995 four teams have entered the NFL. The Carolina Panthers and the Jacksonville 
Jaguars began play in 1995 and the Houston Texans began play in 2002. The Texans 
were allowed to enter the NFL after a $700 million payment to the league. A fourth 
team, Cleveland Browns, was allowed to play after the existing franchise left town for 
Baltimore. Based on 2004 Forbes estimates, the NFL is the most valuable league in 
North America with a total franchise value of $23.4 billion and income of$850 million 
on revenue of $5 .33 billion. The only NFL team to lose money in 2004 was the 
Cardinals. The NHL is North America's least valuable league. 
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Outside of North America most leagues are open leagues. Open leagues are set 
up with several hierarchical divisions and use a system of promotion and relegation. The 
primary determinant of promotion and relegation is on field success. At the end of each 
season the worst performing teams in the top division are relegated or demoted to the 
lower division and the best performing teams in the lower division are promoted to the 
top division. Unlike the NFL entry in English soccer is not rare, over eleven seasons 
between 1992 and 2003 36 different teams have competed in the Premier League. Over 
the same period 54 different teams have competed in Division l, 61 in Division 2 and 51 
in Division 3. Noll (2002) states that the average revenue for teams in the English 
Premier League in 2000 exceeded $50 million with average profit per team of $5 million. 
The market cap of the most valuable team in the Premier League, Manchester United, is 
around $1 billion. 
The structure of a league may have consequences for conduct and performance 
and the antitrust treatment of sports. The primary difference between an open and closed 
league is ability for new teams to ebter the existing league. As stated above, entry into a 
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closed league requires the prior approval of the existing team owners and a large fee. A 
closed league will expand if there are profit opportunities in cities that do not have a 
professional team or to prevent entry by a competing league. Most likely a competing 
league would choose locations that were unexploited by an existing league. In order to 
prevent competition from the new league the existing league would choose to expand into 
the unexploited markets. Promotion and relegation serves as a means of entry into the 
major leagues. Any person could start his or her own team, start competing at the bottom 
of the league and gain promotion to the major league over time. Or a person could 
purchase an existing minor league team and hire quality players and coaches and achieve 
the same result. Entry in an open league does not require approval by or a franchise fee 
to existing team owners. Entry is based on the ability to compete not the ability to pay 
existing owners a fee. 
One drawback of the open league system is that new teams must start at the 
bottom of the league and gain promotion to the major league. The history ofRushden 
and Diamonds is an interesting story in English soccer. In 1992 two teams, Rushden 
Town and Irthlingborough Diamonds merged to form Rushden and Diamonds. Prior to 
the merger Rushden was relegated to the Southern League Midland Division because 
their facilities were deemed unfit for Premier Division football, and Diamonds competed 
in the United Counties League. The merged team was able to reach Football League 
status after 9 years. 
The ability to restrict entry in closed leagues enables teams to extract monopoly 
rents through higher ticket prices, higher prices for local television contracts and public 
subsidies for stadia and other facilities. Since there are no alternative competitors in the 
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local market teams can charge monopoly prices for tickets to their games. Teams are 
able to exercise market power for local television contracts. The lack of competing teams 
in their market raises the price that teams are able to charge. The league also imposes 
blackout rules, which force fans to purchase tickets to the event before the league 
broadcasts the event on local stations. The lack of competition in the local market means 
teams are able to get large public subsidies for stadiums and other facilities. 
In open leagues teams have little monopoly power. It is conceivable that a city 
could have more than one team competing in the same sport and even in the same 
league. There are currently nine teams in London that compete in the two tiers of the 
English Football League. With the presence of competition a team would not be able to 
charge monopoly prices for ticket. The presence of alternatives keeps ticket prices near 
competitive levels. The same principle applies to television contracts. Television 
stations would not be willing to pay monopoly prices for contracts when credible 
alternatives are present. The presence of alternatives also reduces the incentive for cities 
to pay subsidies to teams using public funds. A club's threat of relocation is limited 
since the team itself may be relegated and since there is a credible threat of entry from 
new teams. 
Another advantage of promotion and relegation is that it would eliminate 
meaningless games that are prevalent in North American sports. In North American 
sports it becomes clear at some point during the season that a few teams will not compete 
for the championship that year. These teams usually sell or trade their quality players and 
field an inferior team the remainder of the season. This practice is encouraged by the 
fact that there are no penalties for coming in last. In most North American leagues the 
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teams that come in last are rewarded with the highest pick in the draft the next year. 
Meaningless games are less competitive and less desirable to fans. In an open league 
teams compete for the right to be promoted, but also to avoid relegation. Teams not in 
contention for the league championship have the incentive to field the best quality team 
they can, all season long. 
Adopting the model from Szymanski and Ross (2000) and Szymanski and Valletti 
(2002), it can be shown that teams tend to spend more on talent in an open league than in 
a closed league. The increased spending on player talent means that teams in an open 
league will be less profitable than teams in a closed league. This essay shows that the 
Szymanski and Ross model implies that aggregate spending is higher for an open league 
and aggregate profit is lower. Relegation means competing in a lower division with less 
revenue generating potential. Teams will spend more on player talent to avoid relegation. 
The prospect of promotion to a higher division with more revenue generating potential 
causes teams in the lower division to spend more than they would in a closed league. 
These results are consistent with Noll (2002). Noll concludes that, holding all else 
constant, leagues that practice promotion and relegation will have stronger teams than 
leagues that are closed. 
Major League Soccer (MLS), the top soccer league in the United States, will 
always be weaker than teams from the top leagues in Europe because the MLS does not 
practice promotion and relegation. Szymanski and Valletti (2002) consider a case with 
two large market teams and two small market teams and find that the difference between 
the strength of the two markets determines the total effort in the league. As the 
difference between the markets increases, total league effort increases, but they were 
unable to generalize any results for their asymmetric model. 
Models 
Open League 
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A two period model is developed in this study so that investment in talent in the 
first period is affected by the prospect of promotion or relegation. Assume that large 
market teams, teams I and 2, start in the top division and small market teams, teams 3 
and 4, start in the lower division. First period expected profit for large market teams can 
be written as 
where Dµ,1 is the expected profit of a large market team from retaining a place in the top 
division and Dµ,2 the expected profit following relegation to the lower division. The 
drawing power of large market teams is µ which is assumed to be greater than one and 6 
is the discount rate. 
First period expected profit for small market teams is 
D1 is the expected profit of a small market team from promotion to the top division and 
D2 is the expected profit from remaining in the bottom division. The drawing power of a 
small market teams is A which is assumed to be less than one. Maximizing each of these 
functions with respect to talent, t;, gives 
These terms generalize for n teams in the top division and for n teams in the lower 
division 
Assuming team 2 is demoted to the lower division and team 3 is promoted to the top 
division, the second period expected profit for each team is the second period is 
E(:r2)= _t1 -µ-t 
I / +/ I 
I 3 
E(1l2)= _t3 __ t 
3 t +t 3 
1 3 
Maximizing each of the above equations with respect to team spending on talent and 
solving for second period investment in talent results in 
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Given the values above we can solve for second period expected profit. 
2 µ3 
7i1 = D µ 1 = ( )2 ' 1+µ 
2 ).,µ3 
7i2 = Dµ ,2 = (1 + µ)2 
These values can be generalized for n-teams per division. 
2• _ (n-l)µ(kµ-(k-1)) 
.'i - (kµ+(n-k))2 
2• _ (n-1);.,µ((n-k)µ-(n-k-I)) 
12 -
(k + (n - k )µ )2 
2• (n-I)µ((n-k )-(n-k-1)µ) 
13 = (kµ+(n-k ))2 
2• _ (n-1);.,µ(k-(k-l)µ) 
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- (k+(n-k)µ)2 
1l2 =D = (kµ-(k-1))2 µ 
I µ ,I (kµ+(n-k))2 
7i 2 =D = ((n-k)µ-(n-k-1))2 ).,µ 
2 
µ ,
2 (k + (n - k )µ )2 
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tr; =Di= ({n-k-I)µ-~1-k))2 
(kµ+(n-k))2 
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The subscripts represent teams that are promoted and relegated in each division. 
Assuming that there are n-teams per division, team I represents the values for any large 
market team that remains in the top division while team 2 represents the values for any 
large market team relegated to the lower division. Team 3 represents the values for any 
small market team promoted from the lower division to the top division while team 4 
represents the values for small market teams that remain in the lower division. 
It is possible to expand the model to include the number of teams that are 
promoted and relegated, variable k. For simplicity it is assumed that the number of teams 
promoted is the same as the number of teams relegated. 
Inserting the values for Dµ,1 and Dµ,2 into tt and D1 and D2 into rt yields 
Generalized for n-teams per division and k number of teams being promoted and 
relegated results in a first period investment in talent for large market teams and small 
market teams 
1• - 1• - n-1( o((kµ-(k-1))2 µ ((n-k)µ-(n-k-1))2 ).,µJJ 
11 
-t2 - n2 µ+ (kµ+(n-k))2 (k+(n-k)µ)2 
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1• = 1• = n-1( A 0(((n-k-l)µ-(n-k))2 _ ((k-l)µ-k)2 AJJ 
13 14 n2 l + (kµ+(n-k))2 (k+(n-k)µ)2 
Nothing is gained by further simplification of these results. Once the values for Dµ, 1, 
Dµ,2, D1, D2, 1t and 1t are calculated, it is possible to then calculate first period expected 
profit for teams in each division. We obtain the following solutions: 
I= l =..!_[ s:((1+3J)µ
3J] 1l'1 1l'2 µ+u ( )2 
4 1+µ 
For n-teams per division and k number of teams being promoted and relegated first 
period expected profit is 
1 _ 1 __ 1[ s:((kµ-(k-1))2 µ (n2 -lX(n-k)µ-(n-k-1))2 AµJJ 
1l'1 - 1l'2 - 2 µ + U ( ( ):\2 + ( ( ) )2 n kµ+ n-k 'J k+ n-k µ 
1 = 1 =-1 [ 1 s:(((n-k-I)µ-(n-k))2 (n2 -IX(k-l)µ-k)2 A)J 
1l'3 1l'4 2 /l, + U ( ( ))2 + ( ( ) )2 n kµ+ n-k k+ n-k µ 
Closed League 
Initially it is assumed that the closed league is made up of two large market teams. 
Expected profit each period can be written as 
The profit maximizing investment in talent and expected profit in each period will be 
t • - 1· = µ I - 2 
4 
Cl F ON UNIVE TY LI p 
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Szymanski and Ross give expected profit as 
Admission of a small market team into the league would not be profitable for the two 
large market teams. Spending on talent for the large market teams and the small market 
team becomes 
Team profit is now 
• _ 2µ(2-µ ) 
13 - (µ+2)2 
The addition of the third team reduces the profit of each incumbent by an amount equal to 
µ(3µ 2 -4µ-4) 
(µ+2)2 
Aggregate profit falls by 
3µ 2 -8µ+4 
2(µ+2) 
37 
In this model entry will only occur if the existing teams can obtain a fee large enough to 
compensate them for their lost profit. 
Since large market teams will not voluntarily expand the league, it is more 
conceivable that large and small market teams form competing leagues. One league will 
be made up of all large market teams and the other will be made up of all small market 
teams. Assuming that teams I and 2 are large market teams and teams 3 and 4 are small 
market teams, every period teams face the same problem. Expected profit can be written 
as 
The drawing power of large market teams is µ and is assumed to be greater than I . The 
drawing power of small market teams is A and is less than 1. The profit maximizing 
investment in talent and expected profit each period is 
If the model is generalized to n-teams per league the profit maximizing investment in 
talent and expected profit become 
n-1 
t; = --µ n2 
I 
1i1 = - 2 µ 
n 
• n-I 
t = -A, 
3 2 n 
I 
1i = -A, 
3 n2 
Results 
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Figures I and 2 show the values of team effort and team profit for both top 
division and bottom division teams in an open league. Since teams in the top 
division have a higher drawing power it is no surprise that top division teams 
spend more on player talent than bottom division teams and also have higher 
profits. As the number of teams in the top division increases, the incentive to 
invest in player talent decreases and the probability of winning the championship 
decreases. In Figure 1, top division teams spend an average of 1079% more on 
player talent than teams in the bottom division. 
2 3 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Number of Teams 
Figure 2. Open league team profit. Profit for teams in the top and bottom divisions 
holding constant )..=O. l, µ=l .2, cS=0.1 and k:=2 as the number of teams in each division 
increases. 
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Figures 3 and 4 graph spending on player talent and team profit for µ=1.01 
and A.=0.9. In Figure 3, top division teams still spend about 12.2% more on player 
talent than bottom division teams even though the drawing power of the top 
division teams is close to the drawing power of the bottom division teams. 
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Figure 3. Open league team spending on player talent. Team spending in the top and 
bottom divisions holding constant A.=0.9, µ=1.01, 6=0.1 and k=2 as the number of teams 
in each division increases. 
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1un11er of r_,,. 
Figure 4. Open league team profit. Profit for teams in the top and bottom divisions 
holding constant A.=0.9, µ=1.01 , 6=0.1 and k=2 as the number of teams in each division 
increases. 
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Figures 5 and 6 compare the effects of changes in drawing power of large 
market teams, µ, on investing in player talent for top division and bottom division 
teams. As µ increases teams have the incentive to increase their investment in 
player talent. Winning and playing in the top division is now more valuable so 
teams would be willing to spend more. The same is true for bottom division 
teams. As µ increases, the value of being promoted and competing in the top 
division increases so bottom division teams spend more on player talent . 
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Figure 5. Spending by teams in the top division. Changes in spending by teams in the top 
division for different values ofµ and n, holding constant l=O. l, 6=0.1 and k=2. 
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As shown in Figure 5, top division teams spend about 18.2% more on 
player talent asµ increases from 1. 1 to 1.3. Asµ increases from 1.3 to 1.6 teams 
spend an average of 23 .2% more and spending increases another 18.8% asµ 
increases from 1.6 to 1.9. Teams in the bottom division increase spending by 
2.3% as µ increases from 1. I to 1.3. When spending increases I 0.2% as µ 
increases from 1.3 to 1.6 and 14.9% as µ increases from 1.6 to 1.9. 
0.0350~-------------------------~ 
0.0300 +-\---------------- -------------1 
0.0250 +---,\------------------------ ----1 
0.0200 -t----'k---------------------------1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 'Z7 28 29 30 
Num.,.r of T....,. 
- 1.1 
-1.3 
1.6 
__,,. 1.9 
Figure 6. Spending by teams in the bottom division. Changes in spending by teams in the 
bottom division for different values ofµ and n, holding constant 11.=0. l, o=0.1 and k=2. 
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Figure 7. Spending by teams in the top division. Changes in spending by teams in the top 
division for different values of 11. and n, holding constant µ=1.2, o=O. l and k=2. 
Spending for top division and bottom division teams is presented in 
Figures 7 and 8. A change in the drawing power of bottom division teams will 
change the incentive for teams to invest in player talent. Teams in the bottom 
division have higher revenue as A increases so they are willing to spend more. 
As A increases from 0.1 to 0.3, bottom division teams increase spending by 
195%. 
An increase m A from 0.3 to 0.6 increases spending by 99% and an 
increase in A to 0.9 increases spending by 49%. Changes in 11. have little impact 
on the spending behavior of teams in the top division, but spending decreases as A 
increases, reflecting the decreased expected cost of relegation. On average 
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spending by top division teams decreases by 0.14% for each increase in A. The 
loss of revenue due to relegation is less as the drawing power of bottom division 
teams increases. 
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Figure 8. Spending by teams in the bottom division. Changes in spending by teams in the 
bottom division for different values of1 and n, holding constant µ=1.2, 6=0.1 and k=2. 
As these results suggest, the elasticity of team spending on player talent 
with respect to team drawing power is 1. Although the effects of changes in 
drawing power on team spending in closed leagues are not presented, it is worth 
noting that the elasticity there is also 1. 
Figures 9 and l O graph team spending and team profit for top division 
teams as the number of teams that are promoted and relegated increases. Top 
division teams will increase their spending on player talent in order to avoid 
relegation. As spending increases, profits will decrease. 
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Figure 9. Changes in spending by teams in the top division. Changes in spending by 
teams in the top division for different values of k, holding constant µ=1.2, A.=0.1, 6=0.1 
and n=20. 
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Figure 10. Changes in profit for teams in the top division. Changes in profit for teams in 
the top division for different values ofk, holding constant µ=1.2, 11.=0. l, o=O. land n=20. 
Increasing the number of teams that are promoted and relegated has the 
opposite impact on teams in the bottom division. Ask increases, the probability 
of promotion increases so teams in the bottom division decrease spending on 
player talent. As spending on player talent decreases, team profits increase. 
Figure 11 graphs team spending of bottom division teams as k increases, and 
figure 12 graphs team profit ask increases. Changing the number of teams that are 
promoted and relegated has little impact on aggregate spending in the league. As k 
increases, teams in the top division have the incentive to increase spending on player 
talent since the probability of relegation increases. But the model predicts that spending 
by these teams will increase by less than 1 % . 
48 
K 
Figure 11. Changes in spending by teams in the bottom division. Changes in spending by 
teams in the bottom division for different values of k holding constant µ=1.2, A.=0.1, 
o=O. l and n=20. 
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Figure 12. Changes in profit for teams in the bottom division. Changes in profit for 
teams in the bottom division for different values of k holding constant µ=1.2, A.=0.1, 
&=o.1 and n=20. 
Figures 13 and 14 compare team spending and team profit in both open and 
closed leagues. In general, top division teams spend more on player talent than 
large market teams in a closed league. The threat of relegation gives teams in the 
top division an additional incentive to invest in higher quality players than teams 
in closed leagues. Recall that relegation means playing in the bottom division 
with lower revenue generating potential. Large market teams in a closed league 
do not have to worry about relegation when they make decisions on how much to 
spend on player talent. 
Teams that compete in the bottom division of an open league will spend 
more than small market teams in a closed league because of the prospect of 
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promotion. Teams in the bottom division spend more for two reasons. The first is 
that teams seek promotion because the top division has higher revenue generating 
potential than the bottom division. The second reason teams seek promotion is 
that the prize or championship can only be won by teams in the top division. 
Promotion and relegation give teams an added incentive to spend more on player 
talent than teams in a closed league. This suggests that the overall quality of play 
will be higher in an open league than in a closed league and fan utility will be 
higher. To investigate this aggregate spending in both leagues was reviewed. 
The model ignores competition between leagues such as Major League Soccer in 
the United States and the Premier League in England. In general as the difference in 
drawing power between top division and bottom division teams increases, open leagues 
will produce a higher level of aggregate spending. As the difference in drawing power 
decreases, closed leagues will produce higher aggregate spending. These results are 
similar to the results of the symmetric model in Szymanski and Valletti (2002). The 
difference in aggregate spending between the open league and the closed league does not 
change as k increases from 2 to 3. The average difference in spending between the 
leagues is 1.8%. 
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Figure 13. Team spending in open and closed leagues. Changes in team spending in open 
and closed leagues for different values of n, holding constant values of µ=1.2 , 11.=0. l , 
6=0.1 and k=2. 
A major change occurred in England ' s football league in the late 1980' s and the 
early 1990 ' s. The top division, later named the Premier League, shrunk from 24 to 20 
teams between 1986 and 1988. The Premier League returned to 22 teams during the 
1991-1992 season and then back to 20 teams in the 1995-1996 season. Dominant 
teams in the Premier League were apparently unhappy and in 1992 the Premier 
League broke away from the Football League, but still participated in the 
promotion and relegation scheme with the lower divisions. The model predicts 
an increase in spending on player talent by teams in the top division and an 
increase in team profit. 
-
t 
~-
, 
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As the number of teams in the top division decreases, the probability of 
relegation increases so teams will spend more on player talent. Team profit also 
increases as the number of teams in the division decrease. This can be seen in 
Figure 14. The teams that were relegated out of the top division are placed into 
the bottom division. The model predicts that spending on player talent in the 
bottom division will fall since the probability of promotion is lower. Aggregate 
spending and aggregate profit for the league decreases as shown in Figures 15, 16, 
17, and 18. 
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Figure 14. Changes in aggregate league spending in open and closed leagues for different 
values ofn, holding constant µ=1.2, 11.=0.l, o=0.1 and k=2. 
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Figure 15. Changes in aggregate league spending in open and closed leagues for different 
values ofn, holding constant µ=1.8, A.=0.1, o=O.l and k=2. 
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Figure 16. Changes in aggregate spending in open and closed leagues for different values 
ofn, holding constant µ=1.8, A=O. l, 6=0.1 and k=3. 
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Figure 17. Changes in aggregate league spending in open and closed leagues for different 
values of n, holding constant µ=2.1, )..=0.1, o=0.1 and k=3. 
The model makes no clear predictions about competitive balance. Large 
market teams will tend to dominate the league because they generate more 
revenue to spend on quality players. This is a standard result Fort (2003). 
Although small market teams get promoted to the top division, their stay is 
typically brief. These teams do not generate enough revenue to compete in the 
top division and are, therefore relegated soon after. Even this brief stay in the 
top division may be beneficial to smaller market teams. Noll (2002) finds that on 
average, promotion into the Premier League is accompanied by an increase in 
attendance of 6,000 people per game. The benefits of promotion seem to last for a 
while after the team has been relegated to the lower division. This gives marginal 
teams the incentive to pursue a strategy of bouncing back and forth between the 
top division and the lower division. 
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The issue of competitive balance is often used as an excuse for the 
restrictive practices of North American sports leagues. Teams in North America 
argue that in order to keep or promote competitive balance they must impose 
things like salary caps, luxury taxes, and revenue sharing. An extension of this 
framework to these issues would be a worthwhile undertaking. 
Conclusion 
This researcher extends the models found in Szymanski and Ross (2000) 
and Szymanski and Valletti (2002) and generates new results. In particular, this 
essay finds that sports leagues that practice promotion and relegation will have 
unambiguously higher aggregate spending on player talent than closed sports 
leagues. 
Promotion and relegation add an additional dimension to league play that 
is not present in closed leagues. Openness eliminates meaningless games that are 
present in North American sports. In order to avoid relegation, teams must play at 
the highest level all season long. Competition among top division teams to avoid 
relegation produces more spending on player talent than large market teams in a 
closed league. Teams in lower divisions will spend more on player talent than 
small market teams in a closed league since the prospect of promotion means 
higher expected profit. Higher spending on player talent at each hierarchical level 
means that the overall quality of play will be higher in an open league. If fans 
derive utility from the quality of on-field play, fans of open leagues will have 
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higher utility than fans of closed leagues. These results are further enhanced by 
consideration of international competition between systems of leagues. 
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THE IMP ACT OF A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISE 
ON COUNTY EMPLOYMENT 
Introduction 
The controversy whether to subsidize professional sports teams and their facilities 
seems to have no end. All across the United States politicians are singing the praises of 
sports as a tool for economic development. Voters in the city of Arlington, Texas 
recently approved the funding for a new stadium for the Dallas Cowboys. City officials 
claim that the new stadium will bring in 2,000 new jobs and $2.9 million in city revenue. 
Officials in New York recently proposed spending over $2 billion on a new stadium as 
part of a failed bid to win the 2012 Olympics and to lure the Jets away from New Jersey. 
The project fell apart when a state committee rejected funding for the stadium. 
The Supreme Court recently accepted the politicians' dubious claim of"economic 
development" in the controversial Keio decision. The Court ruled that New London, 
Connecticut had the authority to take homes for a private development project. In order 
for the Arlington project to go forward, several pieces of property need to be transferred 
to the city. Litigation and legislation have been triggered by the Kelo case. Many states 
are rushing to limit the power of local governments to use eminent domain for economic 
development projects. 
Stadium advocates argue that there are several benefits to having a major league 
team in the city and that building the stadium is more of an investment rather than 
wasteful government spending. The claimed payoff to this investment is an increase in 
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employment growth, an increase in government revenue and an increase in the quality of 
life in the city. The benefits can be categorized into three types: direct benefits, indirect 
benefits and intangible benefits. 
Direct Benefits 
Direct benefits are the benefits derived from the construction of the new stadium 
or the renovation of an existing facility . Stadium advocates claim construction spending 
increases employment and adds to the overall economy through economic multipliers. 
The overall impact of the one time increase in construction spending could be small. 
Construction spending represents a one-time increase in expenditures and, depending on 
the size of the project, the impact could be small and short lived. There is also the 
question of whether or not the new construction defers other planned construction. If this 
is the case, the new spending will have little impact on the local economy. Other direct 
benefits include rent paid by the tenants, spending on concessions, parking fees, 
advertising and ticket sales. There are several potential flaws in the use of economic 
multipliers. There is the question of how much of the direct spending stays in the local 
economy and that most of the jobs created through the direct benefits will be part-time or 
temporary jobs, so the impact on the overall economy in the county will be negligible. 
Indirect Benefits 
Sports facilities also benefit the local economy through indirect spending in sports 
related industries. Impact studies claim that spending on hotels, restaurants, bars and 
retail stores will increase because of they are complements to the sports industry. 
Visitors who attend games will spend money in sports related industries. The increase in 
demand in these industries will result in an increase in employment and an increase in the 
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incomes of those employed in these industries. There have been several academic studies 
that attempt to measure this impact. Most of these studies fail to find any significant 
impact from the presence of sports teams on the local economy. Baade and Dye (1990) 
look at the level of retail sales and aggregate income in nine metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs) between 1965 and 1983. Baade and Dye (1990) found that there is an 
insignificant impact of a stadium on the level ofMSA income. In four of the nine MSAs, 
the impact of a stadium had a negative effect on income. The researchers also fail to find 
any significant relationship between the presence of a sports stadium and retail sales. 
Baade (1996) uses a sample of forty-eight cities between 1958 and 1987 to look at 
employment in the amusements and recreation and commercial sports industries. Baade 
(1996) failed to find a positive correlation between professional sports and job creation. 
Using a similar approach, Baade and Sanderson (1997) look at employment in ten MSAs 
between 1958 and 1993. Using data on the amusement and recreation and commercial 
sports industries, they find nine cities where there was a significant impact from the 
presence of a professional sports team. Of the nine statistically significant results five 
were positive and four were negative. 
Coates and Humphreys (2003) studied the impact of sports franchises on 
employment and earnings in thirty-seven MSAs between 1969 and 1996. They found 
some evidence that the presence of a sports franchise had a negative impact on 
employment in both the retail and services sectors, but only the services sector coefficient 
was significant. They estimated that the mean impact would be a loss of 1022 jobs in the 
retail sector. Coates and Humphreys (2003) also estimated the impact of sports on 
earnings in the eating and drinking, amusements and recreation and hotels and lodging 
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sectors. Earnings fell by $162 per worker in the eating and drinking sector and earnings 
increased by $10 in the hotel and lodging sector. Earnings in the amusements and 
recreation sector increased by $490, but this sector included the salaries of professional 
athletes. Coates and Humphreys (1999) researched real per capita income in 37 MSA' s 
between 1969 and 1994. They found evidence that the presence of a sports franchise 
reduced the level of real per capita income, but had no impact on the growth rate of real 
per capita income in their sample. 
Intangible Benefits 
Intangible benefits can be defined as the benefits to the local economy of being 
labeled a major league city. Politicians and stadium advocates often argue that being a 
major league city will help attract new industries and business to the local area. This 
implies that companies not related to the sports industry want to be in a city that hosts a 
major league team. Baade and Dye (1988) tested this by looking at three measures of 
manufacturing activity: manufacturing employment, manufacturing value added and new 
capital expenditures in eight MSAs between 1965 and 1978. They found little support of 
any link between major league sports and manufacturing activity. Carlino and Coulson 
(2004) estimated the willingness to pay for an NFL franchise by looking at rental rates 
and wages in cities. Their hypothesis was that sports fans are willing to pay for a team by 
accepting lower wages and paying higher rental rates. Based on their results they 
concluded that in order to retain an NFL franchise, some subsidies may be justified in 
large cities. 
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Data 
This section is a discussion of the data used in the analysis. The data cover the 
period 1993 to 2002. Employment statistics were taken from the County Business 
Pattern dataset, which is produced by the US Census Bureau. The data used in this study 
represents an important extension to the existing literature. The previous literature used 
MSA level data, while this study uses more detailed county level data. This study also 
uses more detailed 3 and 4-digit SIC employment data rather than 2-digit major industry 
code data. By narrowing the geographic region of interest, it is anticipated that some 
impact from the presence of a sports franchise, should it exist, can be more readily 
detected. 
Sports related spending represents a small fraction of total spending in an MSA, 
so it should be no surprise that the previous literature found no correlation between the 
presence of a sports franchise and employment growth. The use of 3 and 4-digit SIC 
employment data helps to refine the analysis in this paper as well. The 2-digit major 
industry codes include many non-sports related industries. If sports related spending is 
only a small fraction of total county spending, using employment data from 2-digit 
industry codes may not pick up changes in employment related to a sports franchise. The 
industries used in this study are industries that are often citied as beneficiaries to sports 
stadiums. 
The apparel and accessory store industry is said to benefit because of an increase 
in foot traffic of visitors of stadium events. Fans of the local sports teams will also 
purchase sports related memorabilia from local stores. The additional spending at these 
stores will increase retail employment. Employment in eating and drinking places may 
also increase due to a new sports team. The argument is that fans that frequent the 
stadium will also spend money at local restaurants and bars. In addition to the stadium 
traffic, fans not seeking to attend games live will seek out bars and restaurants to watch 
the events on live television. 
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Several industries are said to benefit from an increase in tourism due to the new 
sports team. Automobile rentals, gas stations and hotels will all benefit from fans that 
travel from far away to attend events at the sports stadium. (See Table 10.) If the claims 
made in economic impact studies are correct, then we should be able to observe an 
increase in employment in these industries after a new NFL franchise moves into the 
area. 
Table 10. Industries in Dataset 
Apparel and accessory stores Eating places 
Drinking places Liquor stores 
Hotels and other lodging Automobile rentals 
Gasoline service stations 
Lists of counties that are used in this study along with summary statistics of the 
employment data are provided in Appendix B. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
the impact of an NFL franchise on county employment. There are a total of 43 counties 
in the dataset. Thirty-three counties had an NFL franchise at some point during the 
sample period. 
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Models 
This paper uses two different econometric specifications. The first model is 
similar to that found in Baade (1996) and Baade and Sanderson (1997). It estimates the 
impact of sports using ratios of county to state data The following equation is used to 
estimate jobs created by sports teams: 
CEmp; 1 Cine; 1 CPoP; 1 
---' = P o + P1 ' + Pi ' + P3NFL; r + P4MLBi r + P5NBA; r + P6Cnty; + &; 1 
SEmpj,t Slncj,t SPop j,, · · · · 
where CEmp;,i /S'E = county i' s share of state employment in one of the industries 
/S1 mpj,t 
listed in Table 10 at time t, Clnc;,c ~nc . 
1 
is the ratio of county i's real per capita income 
/S1 1• 
to the state j ' s per capita income at time t, CPop;,i {p is the ratio of county i's 
/S1 opj,t 
population to state j ' s population at time t, NFL is a dummy variable with a value of I 
for the presence of a NFL team at time t and O otherwise, MLB is a dummy variable with 
a value of 1 for the presence of a MLB team at time t and O otherwise, NBA is a dummy 
variable with a value of I for the presence of a NBA team at time t and O otherwise, 
Cnty is a fixed effect county dummy variable, and & is the error term. 
The purpose of this model is to capture any change in county employment relative 
to changes in state employment. If county employment increases due to the presence of 
an NFL franchise, then the ratio of county to state employment should increase after an 
NFL team moves in to the area. If there is a negative impact on county employment, the 
ratio of county to state employment will decrease when a team moves into the area. 
Coates and Humphreys (2003) criticize this model because the employment share 
in a county (i) can go up or down as a consequence of changes in employment in county 
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(j). Suppose the level of employment in county (j) increases, while the level of 
employment in county (i) does not. At the same time, a new NFL stadium is built in 
county (i). The result would be that county (j)'s share of state employment would 
increase and county (i)' s share would decrease. This would give us the result that the 
NFL stadium had a negative impact on employment in county (i) when in fact 
employment has not changed at all. With this problem in mind, this researcher used a 
second specification adopted from Coates and Humphreys (1999). They used an event 
study model similar to that found in the finance literature. The model used in this study 
1s: 
where CE;,, is the level of county (i) ' s employment at time tin an industry, CE, is the 
average county employment in an industry at time t, NFL is a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 for the presence of a NFL team at time t and O otherwise, MLB is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 for the presence of a MLB team at time t and O otherwise, 
NBA is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the presence of a NBA team at time t and 
0 otherwise, Cnty is a fixed effect county dummy variable, and e is the error term. 
For both models, the Hausman specification test concluded that a fixed effect 
model was preferred over a random effects model. The results of the test are not 
provided. Additional tests determined that the data suffered from first order serial 
correlation. Stata software includes commands that correct for serial correlation using 
the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. 
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Results 
Table 11 reports the estimated coefficients for the sports dummy variables using 
the Baade model. Complete regression results are presented in Appendix C. In both 
cases, county and year dummy variables are not reported. None of the sports dummy 
variables come out significant suggesting that there is no correlation between the 
presence of a professional sports franchise and employment in any of the included 
industries. This result, although consistent with previous academic literature, may be 
surprising to stadium advocates. The included industries are those industries that stadium 
advocates claim will benefit from the presence of a sports franchise. 
Table 11 . Estimated Sports Coefficients from the Baade Model 
Dependant Variable 
Gas 
Variable Aggregate Station Aooarel 
NFL -0.00114 -0.00914 -0.00271 
(-1.08) (-0.8) (-0.2) 
NBA 0.00216 0.01093 -0.00138 
(0.84) (0.4) (-0.04) 
MLB 0.0004 0.02935 -0.00623 
(0.11) (0.96) (-0.13) 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Eating Drinking 
Places Places 
-0.00039 -0.03271 
(-0.04) (-1.09J 
0.0094 0.02423 
(0.4) (0.34) 
-0.01607 -0.02527 
(-0.51) (-0.26) 
Liquor 
Stores 
0.01071 
(0.62J 
0.0768 
(1.94) 
-0.00194 
(-0.04) 
Car 
Hotel Rental 
0.00417 -0.02626 
(0.23) (-0.18) 
0.04362 0.34891 
(0.98) (0.57) 
-0.00621 -0.11296 
(-0.1) (-0.26) 
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The results from the Baade regression ( Appendix C) are supported by the results of the 
regression using the model from Coates and Humphreys (Appendix D). The only 
significant coefficient comes from the regression using drinking employment data. The 
coefficient for the NFL comes out negative. The estimate represents a loss of 159 jobs in 
the drinking places industry when a new NFL team moves into the county. 
Table 12. Estimated Sports Coefficients from Coates and Humphreys Model. 
Dependent Variable 
Eating Drinking Liquor Car Gas 
Variable Atnrregate Apparel Places Places Stores Hotel Rental Stations 
~ -10738.3 244.4053 628.5591 -159.276* -14.7611 -39.7479 -50.8261 -90.7858 
(-1.66) (1.08' (1.29' (-2 . l8j (-0.62) (-0.09) (-0.64' (-0.98) 
MLB 3488.562 -748.669 -271.99 -83 .9521 -2.3844 -1114.99 141.8974 826.0161 
(0.15) (-0.93j (-0.15' (-0.34) (-0.03) (-0.7) (0.61 ' (2.56) 
NBA 17602.31 285.1612 1225.557 223 .9972 79.1036 587.1191 208.1754 84.94303 
(1.05) (0.5) (0.97~ 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
t-statistics in parentheses 
(1 .27) 
' 
(1.45) (0.52) (0 .63j 
Although the coefficients for all the sports dummy variables came out insignificant, it is 
appropriate to give some estimate of the change in employment due to the addition or 
elimination of an NFL team in some counties. Table 13 gives estimates of the change in 
aggregate county employment. All the counties that gained an NFL franchise during the 
sample period experienced a decrease in aggregate employment the first year the team 
(0.37) 
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began play. Los Angeles, Harris and Cuyahoga Counties lost teams during the sample 
period. Each of these counties experienced an increase in aggregate employment after an 
NFL franchise moved away from the county. These estimates, although insignificant, 
cast doubt on the claims made by economic impact studies that sports stadiums are a 
catalyst for economic development and employment growth. 
Table 13. Estimated Change in Aggregate County Employment from NFL Franchises 
County Year Team Status Change in Aggregate Employment 
St. Louis 1995 Gained Team -601 
Mecklenburg 1995 Gained Team -472 
Los Angeles 1995 Lost Team +3983 
Harris 1997 Lost Team +1723 
Harris 2002 Gained Team -1886 
Duval 1995 Gained Team -397 
Davidson 1997 Gained Team -432 
Cuyahoga 1996 Lost Team +821 
Cuyahoga 1999 Gained Team -863 
Baltimore 1996 Gained Team -340 
Alameda 1995 Gained Team -599 
The results from the Coates and Humphreys model predict a loss of jobs with the addition 
of an NFL franchise and the addition of jobs with the loss of an NFL franchise. The 
magnitudes of the jobs lost or gained are less plausible. The results predict a loss of 
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10,738 jobs economy wide when a new NFL franchise enters the county. The loss of an 
NFL team would mean an additional 10,738 county jobs. These results seem too large to 
be believable, but the sign of the coefficient is the same as with the Baade model. 
There are several possible explanations for the above results. One possible 
explanation is that the impact of a sports franchise is too small to capture using county 
level data. As stated earlier, most of the previous academic literature used MSA level 
data and failed to find any correlation between sports franchises and employment growth. 
It may be possible to find a relationship between employment growth and sports facilities 
by narrowing the geographic area if interest. It may be that businesses within a few 
blocks receive indirect benefits because fans do not travel far from a stadium on game 
day. Therefore the spending will not be spread out over the entire county or MSA and be 
limited to a small geographic area around the stadium. 
Another possibility lies within the data itself Employment data in the County 
Business Patterns is based on March payroll data. Since the NFL season has been 
completed for almost two months, the March payroll data may be missing the 
employment impact from the NFL. This may be true, but it supports the idea that the 
NFL does not create quality full-time employment. It may be that NFL franchises create 
only seasonal and part-time jobs. This criticism supports the idea that public funding for 
sports stadiums is not in the public interest and that there are few measurable economic 
benefits to the spending. 
Conclusion 
Public subsidies for professional sports stadiums are often used as a means to 
stimulate economic development in local communities. Economic impact studies claim 
that stadiums will induce job creation and revenue expansion. Using data on 
metropolitan statistical areas, academics find little to support the claims that stadiums 
help create jobs and increase the income in the local economy. This paper adds to the 
current literature by using detailed county level data. 
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For jobs to be created, economic activity must shift towards the county when a 
new sports team moves into the area. The industries that benefit from direct and indirect 
spending should exhibit employment growth relative to the rest of the state due to sports 
related spending. The additional spending should also increase the increase county 
income relative to the rest of the state. The results in this paper fail to find any 
correlation between an NFL franchise and employment or income growth. If there is any 
correlation, it may be negative. The movement of a new NFL franchise into an area may 
cause a decrease in aggregate employment in a county. These results strengthen the 
claims against using public funding for sports stadiums as a tool for economic 
development. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The three studies in this thesis explore several issues relating to open and closed 
sports leagues. The ability of a closed league to limit competition creates an artificial 
scarcity of teams. This scarcity enables the existing league members to extract economic 
rents in the form of public subsidies for stadiums. Politicians and team owners claim that 
the use of public funds is justified because the spending brings in hundreds, if not 
thousands, of jobs and millions of dollars in revenue to the local economy. Little 
evidence was found within this research to support these claims. Econometric analysis 
fails to show any correlation between the presence of a professional sports franchise and 
employment growth. 
This research also shows that teams in an open league that practice promotion and 
relegation have a greater incentive to invest in player talent than teams in a close league. 
The promotion and relegation system gives teams in lower divisions the incentive to 
invest more on player talent because promotion to a higher division means greater 
revenue generating potential. Teams already in the upper divisions will increase 
spending on player talent to avoid being relegated to a lower division with lower revenue 
generating potential. These incentives are not present in a closed league; therefore, the 
overall spending and the overall quality of play will usually be higher in an open league 
than a closed league. 
Some open leagues have strict entry restrictions. These restrictions come in the 
form of age requirements, appearance requirements and overall quality of play 
requirements. While these restrictions increase the quality of play in the league, some 
seem to limit entry by new competitors. 
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Appendix A 
PGA Tour Event Priority Ranking 
1. Winners of PGA Championship or U.S. Open prior to 1970 or in the last 10 
calendar years. (Beginning in 1998, this is a five-year exemption.) : 
2. Winners of THE PLAYERS Championship in the last 10 calendar years. 
(Beginning in 1998, this is a five-year exemption.): 
3. Winners of the Masters Tournament in the last 10 calendar years. 
(Beginning in 1998, this is a five-year exemption.): 
4. Winners of the British Open in the last IO calendar years. 
(Beginning in 1998, this is a five-year exemption.): 
5. Winners of the World Series of Golf from 1995 to 1997. (Ten-year exemption.): 
6. THE TOUR Championship winners in the last three years, beginning with the 2002 
winner: 
7. Winners of official money World Golf Championship events in the last three years: 
8. The leader in PGA TOUR official earnings in each of the last five calendar years. 
9. Winners ofPGA TOUR co-sponsored or approved events (except team events) 
within the last two calendar years, or during the current year; winners receive an 
additional year of exemption for each additional win, up to five years: 
10. A. Members of the last-named U.S. Presidents Cup Team: 
B. Members of the last-named International Presidents Cup Team provided they 
were a PGA TOUR member at the time they were named to the team: 
C. Members of the last-named U.S. Ryder Cup team provided they were a 
PGA TOUR member at the time they were named to the team: 
D. Members of the last-named European Ryder Cup Team: 
11. Leaders in official PGA TOUR career earnings, as follows: 
A. Players among the top 50 in career earnings as of the end of the preceding 
calendar year may elect to use a one-time, one-year exemption for the next 
year: 
B. Players among the Top 25 in career earnings as of the end of the preceding 
calendar year may elect to use this special exemption for a second year, 
provided that the player remains among the Top 25 on the career money list. 
12. Sponsor exemptions ( a maximum of eight, which may include 
amateurs with scratch handicaps ofO or less), on the following basis: 
A. Not less than two sponsor invitees shall be PGA TOUR members not 
otherwise exempt for the event. 
B. Not less than two of the top 30 finishers and ties from the last Qualifying 
Tournament, as well as 2-20 from the 2004 Nationwide Tour money list, if 
not all of them can otherwise be accommodated. 
(Note: PGA TOUR members may receive an unlimited number of sponsor invitations. 
!Non-TOUR members may receive a maximum of seven per year). 
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Appendix A 
PGA Tour Event Priority Ranking (Continued) 
13 . Two international players designated by the Commissioner. 
14. The current PGA Club Professional Champion for a maximum of six open events 
(three must be from open tournaments held opposite the British Open and the 
World Golf Championships), in addition to any sponsor selections: 
15. PGA Section Champion or Player of the Year of the Section in which the 
tournament is played. 
16. Two members of the PGA Section in which the tournament is played, who qualify 
through sectional qualifying competitions. 
17. Four low scorers at Open Qualifying which shall normally be held on Monday of 
tournament week. 
18. Past champions of the particular event being contested that week, if cosponsored by 
the PGA TOUR and the same tournament sponsor (except for Team events), 
as follows: 
A Winners prior to July 28, 1970: unlimited exemptions for such events. 
B. Winners after July 28, 1970 and prior to Jan. 1, 2000: 10 years of exemptions 
for such events. 
C. Winners after Jan. 1, 2000: five years of exemptions for such events. 
19. Life Members (who have been active members of the PGA TOUR for 15 years and 
have won at least 20 co-sponsored events): 
20. Top 125 on previous year's Official Money List -- If not exempt under "Special 
Exemptions," the top 125 PGA TOUR members on the previous year's Official 
Money List, in order of their position: 
21. Players who earned more than the 125th place finisher on 2004 PGA TOUR Money 
List as non-members: 
22. Major Medical Extension -- If granted by the Commissioner, if not otherwise 
eligible, and if needed to fill the field, Major Medical Extension: 
23. Leading Money Winner from 2004 Nationwide Tour: 
24. Top 10 and Ties among professionals from the previous open tournament whose 
victory has official status are exempt into the next open tournament whose victory 
has official status. 
25. Top 30 and Ties from the previous year's PGA TOUR Qualifying Tournament, in 
order of their finish, and players 2-20 on the 2004 Nationwide Tour money list: 
26. Players winning three Nationwide Tour events in the current year, in priority 
determined by the date they win their third event. 
27. Minor Medical Extension: 
28. Next 25 members after the Top 125 members from previous year's Official Money 
List. If needed to fill the field, the next 25 PGA TOUR members after the top 125 
PGA TOUR members from the previous year's Official Money List, in order of 
their position on the list: 
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PGA Tour Event Priority Ranking (Continued) 
29. Non-Exempt, Major Medical Extension: 
30. Past Champions, Team Tournament Winners and Veteran Members Beyond 150 on 
Money List: If not otherwise eligible and as needed to fill the field, Past Champion 
members, Team Tournament Winners and Veteran members beyond 150th place on 
the previous year's Money List, in order of their combined official PGA TOUR and 
Nationwide Tour earnings in the previous year. 
31. Past Champion Members: If not otherwise eligible and if needed to fill the field, 
Past Champion members, in order of the total number of cosponsored or approved 
events won, excluding Team events. If two or more players are tied, the player who 
is higher on the PGA TOUR Career Money List shall be eligible. 
32. Special Temporary: If during the course of a PGA TOUR season, a nonmember of 
the PGA TOUR wins an amount of official money ( e.g., by playing in PGA TOUR 
events through sponsor exemptions, Open Qualifying, etc.) equal to the amount 
won in the preceding year by the 150th finisher on the official money list, he will 
be eligible for the remainder of the year. 
33 . Team Tournament Winners: If not otherwise eligible and if needed to fill the field, 
winners of co-sponsored team championships, in order of the total number of team 
championship tournaments won. If two or more players are tied based on the 
number of such tournaments won, the player who is higher on the official PGA 
TOUR Career Money List shall be eligible. 
34. Veteran Members: If not otherwise eligible and if needed to fill the field, Veteran 
members (players who have made a minimum of 150 cuts during their career), in 
order of their standing on the PGA TOUR Career Money List. 
(PGA Tour, 2005) 
78 
AppendixB 
Summary Statistics by County and Industry: 
Alameda CA 
Gasoline parel and 
service accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 2389 
sd 97 699 2124 134 34 578 435 63486 
pparel and otels 
seTVIce accessory Drinking iquor and other ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lodging rental em lo ent 
ean 3313 7603 2518 835 6160 1196 670109 
sd 246 690 2544 160 72 1002 331 17769 
Baltimore MD 
Gasoline pparel and uto-
seTVIce accessory Drinking Liquor obile 
stats stations stores laces stores l rental 
ean 1612 5523 755 913 1598 347 
sd 89 540 1208 162 69 264 146 11519 
Ber en NJ 
Gasoline Apparel and otels uto-
service ssory Drinking Liquor and other obile 
stats stations stores laces stores lo rental 
ean 1894 7618 648 702 3321 1896 
sd 129 400 1600 54 47 110 609 23162 
Bernalillo NM 
pparel and uto-
seTVIce accessory Drinking Liquor obile ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores l ental em loyment 
ean 1461 2530 1347 409 4173 728 241601 
sd 248 443 1082 186 57 281 139 10978 
Brown WI 
parel and otels 
seTVIce accessory Drinking Liquor and other 
stats stations stores laces stores lo rental 
ean 944 979 725 148 1481 155 
sd 130 86 842 170 12 163 18 11051 
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AppendixB 
Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Clark NV 
Gasoline pparel and 
service accessory ggregate 
stats stations stores ent 
ean 3174 6635 534876 
sd 870 2168 850 39 16509 587 102680 
Cobb GA 
Gasoline pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 1471 3725 842 
sd 237 478 1214 107 19 648 240 38258 
Cook IL 
pparel and 
service accessory Drinking Liquor 
stats stations stores laces stores I rental 
ean 7609 29440 7412 2817 26887 4091 
sd 535 2198 7380 327 155 1339 426 85118 
OH 
Apparel and 
servtce ssory 
stats stations stores 
ean 3476 8184 
sd 228 770 2031 210 48 442 166 33757 
DC 
Gasoline pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 740 3306 
sd 125 121 1480 276 874 126 
Dallas TX 
Gasoline pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 5155 11594 
sd 890 997 7671 558 150 1890 403 121514 
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Appendix B 
Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Davidson TN 
Gasoline pparel and 
serv1ce accessory Drinking Liquor Aggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores l rental em lo ent 
ean 2130 4612 573 311 8828 828 376234 
sd 292 252 204 19 1088 116 21204 
Denver co 
Gasoline pparel and 
service accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 1353 2761 
sd 351 291 2869 275 47 641 373 23531 
FL 
pparel and uto-
servtce accessory obile 
stats stations stores 
ean 2168 3630 
sd 298 378 1344 119 30 333 292 30843 
Erie NY 
Gasoline k-\pparel and [Hotels Auto-
servtce accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other mobile Aggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores lodging rental employment 
mean 2444 4504 27562 1913 549 3362 656 400623 
sd 315 373 1251 118 58 321 96 8406 
Fairfax VA 
Gasoline pparel and 
servtce accessory Drinking Liquor 
stats stations stores laces stores l rental 
ean 2144 6607 246 237 5501 216 
sd 126 569 2515 90 43 436 44 67021 
Fulton GA 
pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 2012 7293 
sd 111 1213 4529 152 32 1229 279 78092 
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Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Hamilton OH 
Gasoline pparel and 
service accessory Drinking Liquor 
stats stations stores laces stores 
ean 2221 5639 1950 294 
sd 370 397 1886 606 53 236 15328 
Harris TX 
Gasoline pparel and uto-
service Drinking Liquor obile 
stats stations laces stores lo rental 
ean 6752 16119 4928 725 14412 3080 
sd 1969 1674 9759 719 91 662 349 116042 
Hartford CT 
pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 2089 5348 
sd 179 523 1729 98 46 92 112 23914 
pparel and 
servtce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 4144 8712 1631 
sd 206 1074 3673 355 1050 569 51542 
servtce accessory rinking Liquor 
stats stations stores laces stores 
ean 2609 4621 786 326 
sd 707 893 2509 175 44 692 348 44703 
Jackson MO 
parel and uto-
servtce accessory Drinking Liquor obile 
stats stations stores laces stores I rental 
ean 2215 3096 969 350 4333 291 
sd 275 192 1310 187 10 513 98 18453 
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Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Kin 
pparel and otels uto-
service accessory rinking Liquor and other obile ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lo rental m loyment 
ean 3833 11298 3192 606 12305 2195 937522 
sd 307 1360 4395 347 96 1121 377 79376 
CA 
pparel and 
ccessory Drinking Liquor ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lod in rental m loyment 
ean 13225 41676 7568 3050 37454 7385 3642603 
sd 823 4533 16590 495 201 1820 714 178030 
service Drinking 1quor ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lo rental em lo ent 
ean 7232 11608 4253 390 24110 3865 1184269 
sd 1496 2443 11610 238 89 1687 566 175169 
Marion IN 
Gasoline Apparel and Hotels Auto-
service accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other mobile Aggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores lodging rental employment 
mean 2591 5636 34302 2055 938 6471 1190 521489 
sd 224 637 1246 163 77 362 153 32557 
Mecklenbur NC 
Gasoline parel and uto-
servtce accessory rinking Liquor obile ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lo ental em lo ent 
ean 1807 4654 709 179 5485 1989 455104 
sd 385 595 4130 275 38 573 459 55093 
PA 
servtce sory Drinking 1quor utomob 
stats stations stores laces stores I ile rental 
ean 1677 6809 792 386 2557 676 
sd 91 955 1475 101 42 375 145 29514 
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Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
NY NY 
Gasoline Apparel and !Hotels Auto-
serv1ce accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other mobile Aggregate 
stats stations stores !Places Dlaces stores lod2ing rental employment 
!mean 469 27807 87737 4865 1095 32475 758 1936257 
sd 68 5906 13465 706 161 3467 71 114281 
Nassau NY 
Gasoline pparel and 
serv1ce accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 2174 11340 
sd 76 1565 2720 169 49 122 265 17203 
Norfolk MA 
Gasoline Apparel and Hotels Auto-
serv1ce accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other mobile ~ggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores l_H-'!~ • ,o~ rental employment 
mean 1602 4500 17671 622 741 2473 205 316093 
sd 92 824 2311 69 67 1842 25 24414 
Oakland MI 
pparel and 
service accessory 
stats stations stores 
ean 2777 9982 698 
sd 156 1208 2998 195 32 433 298 61790 
Oklahoma OK 
Gasoline 
sefVlce sory Drinking 1quor 
stats stations stores laces stores 1 
ean 2002 3526 971 199 
sd 215 258 1592 117 12 291 328 19284 
sory 
stats stations stores 
ean 4981 15506 
sd 331 2607 8497 157 73 553 114135 
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Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Orleans LA 
Gasoline Apparel and !Hotels Auto-
service accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other mobile [Aggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores lnAo-ino rental !employment 
mean 929 2627 18204 2129 179 11963 164 209703 
sd 138 249 1225 454 39 989 56 2955 
Gasoline pparel and uto-
servtce accessory Drinking Liquor obile ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores 1 ental em lo ent 
ean 1405 7849 2182 630 6838 1227 590995 
sd 49 585 1903 206 193 1005 209 11047 
Prince Geo e MD 
pparel and 
service accessory Drinking Liquor ggregate 
stats stations stores laces stores lo ental em lo ent 
ean 1784 3733 344 1247 2346 287 239669 
sd 139 340 1000 39 120 412 70 11832 
S ff CA an 1ego 
Gasoline Apparel and Hotels 
service accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other Automob !Aggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores lodging ile rental iemployment 
mean 5491 13734 75884 3495 958 25229 1375 945293 
sd 565 1941 7318 310 37 1740 171 107507 
San Francisco CA 
Gasoline Apparel and Hotels !Auto-
servtce accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other imobile [Aggregate 
stats stations stores places places stores 1:-:~· ·~ irental !employment 
mean 972 8268 35174 2756 358 20576 802 513943 
sd 62 982 3810 178 66 2292 175 29589 
St. Louis MO 
ssory 
stats stations stores 
ean 3336 6978 
sd 193 504 3361 91 41 1047 28482 
l 
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J 
' Appendix B 
Summary Statistics by County and Industry (Continued) 
Wavne MI 
Kiasoline Apparel and Hotels !Auto-
service accessory Eating Drinking Liquor and other lmobile Aggregate 
stats stations stores olaces places stores locming rental employment 
' mean 3718 7548 47530 2792 1161 5795 1801 736309 
sd 192 603 1360 160 159 1136 170 24050 
' ~· 
. 
; 
:: 
: J 
Regression Results from Baade Model 
Dependent Variable, Industry Employment 
Drinking 
Variable Aggregate Gas Station Aooarel Eating Places Places 
NFL -0.00114 -0.00914 -0.00271 -0.00039 -0.03271 
(-1.08) (-0.8) (-0.2) (-0.04) (-1.09) 
NBA 0.00216 0.01093 -0.00138 0.00940 0.02423 
(0.84) (0.4) (-0.04) (0.4) (0.34) 
MLB 0.00040 0.02935 -0.00623 -0.01607 -0.02527 
(0.11) (0.96) (-0.13' (-0.51) (-0.26) 
!Ratio county/ state pop 0.93759*** 4.62845*** 25.18423*** 12.31066*** 23.35473*** 
(5 .59) (6.91 (6.83) (12.24) (6.22) 
Constant 0.05566*** -0.57294*** -2.63316*** -1.60159*** -0.94408*** 
(7.78) (-5 .84) (-20.6) (-23.09) (-3.63' 
Number of Observations 387 387 386 387 386 
R2a 0.9028 0.8488 0.7662 0.8674 0.6575 
lF 5.67 6.50 5.05 13.62 3.61 
Note :: • p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.01 
a. Overall R2 for the regression is shown. Within and between R2 are not reported. 
** t-statistics in parentheses. 
Liquor Store 
0.01071 
(0.62' 
0.07680 
(1.94 
-0.00194 
(-0.04' 
-1.36241 
(-1.24 
0.13388 
(0.68 
384 
0.8282 
0.89 
Hotel 
0.00417 
(0.23) 
0.04362 
(0.98) 
-0.00621 
(-0.1) 
11.94073*** 
(4) 
-1.51594*** 
(-12.18) 
387 
0.6649 
2.24 
Car Rental 
-0.02626 
(-0.18) 
0.34891 
(0.57) 
-0.11296 
(-0.26) 
14.25428 
(1.81) 
-0.14473 
(-0.37' 
365 
0.5994 
1.56 
00 
.....:a 
Regression Results from Coates and Humphreys Model 
Dependent Variable, Industry Employment 
Variable Aj!;gregate Apparel Eating Places Drinking Places Liquor Store 
NFL -10738.3 244.4053 628.5591 -159.276* 
(-1.66) (1.08) (1.29) (-2.18) 
MLB 3488.562 -748.669 -271.99 -83.9521 
(0.15 (-0.93) (-0.15) (-0.34) 
NBA 17602.31 285.1612 1225.557 223 .9972 
(1.05) (0.5) (0.97) (1.27) 
Average aggregate 
employment 1.00614••• 
(10.9' 
Average apparel 
employment -0.45198 
(-0.43) 
Average eating places 
employment 1.00219••• 
(6.58) 
Average drinking places 
employment -0.1894 
(-0.23) 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Overall R2 for the regression is shown. Within and between R2 are not reported. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
-14.7611 
(-0.62) 
-2.3844 
(-0.03) 
79.1036 
(1.45) 
Hotel Car Rental 
-39.7479 -50.8261 
(-0.09) (-0.64) 
-1114.99 141.8974 
(-0. 7) (0.61' 
587.1191 208.1754 
(0.52) (0.63) 
Gas 
Station 
-90.7858 
(-0.98) 
826.0161 
(2.56) 
84.94303 
(0.37) 
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Regression Results from Coates and Humphreys Model (Continued) 
Dependent Variable, Industry Employment 
Variable Aggregate Apparel Eating Places Drinking Places Liquor Store 
Average liquor store 
employment 0.403912 
(0.84) 
Average hotel 
employment 
Average car rental 
employment 
Average gas station 
employment 
Constant -6017.85 14983.35*** -966.871 2830.496*** 393.4167* 
(-0.6) (7.88) (-1.05) (4.65) (2.52) 
Number of Observations 387 386 387 386 384 
R2" 0.0354 0.0011 0.0184 0.1059 0.1600 
F 15.72 15.02 8.25 3.17 2.56 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Overall R2 for the regression is shown. Within and between R2 are not reported. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Hotel 
1.013905 
(3.89) 
126.3568 
(0.18) 
387 
0.0036 
3.08 
Car Rental Gas Station 
0.113886 
(0.45) 
0.989038 
(5.69) 
1460.812*** -325.457 
I 
(6.58) (-2.47) 
366 387 
0.2643 0.1490 
6.41 14.35 
